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Why Default on U.S. Treasuries is Likely
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel*
A "Buried within the October 3,
2008 bailout bill was a
provision permitting the Fed to
pay interest on bank reserves.
Within days, the Fed
implemented this new power,
essentially converting bank
reserves into more government
debt. Now, any seigniorage that
government gains from creating
bank reserves will completely
vanish or be greatly reduced."
For more on hyperinflations, bank
reserves, and central banks, see
Hyperinflation, Money Supply,
and Federal Reserve System in
the Concise Encyclopedia of
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lmost everyone is aware that federal government
spending in the United States is scheduled to
skyrocket, primarily because of Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid. Recent "stimulus" packages have accelerated
the process. Only the naively optimistic actually believe that
politicians will fully resolve this looming fiscal crisis with some
judicious combination of tax hikes and program cuts. Many
predict that, instead, the government will inflate its way out
of this future bind, using Federal Reserve monetary
expansion to fill the shortfall between outlays and receipts.
But I believe, in contrast, that it is far more likely that the
United States will be driven to an outright default on
Treasury securities, openly reneging on the interest due on
its formal debt and probably repudiating part of the
principal.
To understand why, we must look at U.S. fiscal history. Economists refer to the revenue that
government or its central bank generates through monetary expansion as seigniorage. Outside of
America's two hyperinflations (during the Revolution and under the Confederacy during the Civil
War), seigniorage in this country peaked during World War II, when it covered nearly a quarter of
the war's cost and amounted to about 12 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By the Great
Inflation of the 1970s, seigniorage was below two percent of federal expenditures or less than half
a percent of GDP.  This was partly a result of globalization, in which international competition
disciplines central banks. And it also was the result of sophisticated financial systems, with
fractional reserve banking, in which most of the money that people actually hold is created
privately, by banks and other financial institutions, rather than by government. Consider how little
of your own cash balances are in the form of government-issued Federal Reserve notes and
Treasury coin, rather than in the form of privately created bank deposits and money market funds.
Privately created money, even when its quantity expands, provides no income to government.
Consequently, seigniorage has become a trivial source of revenue, not just in the United States,
but also throughout the developed world. Only in poor countries, such as Zimbabwe, with their
primitive financial sectors, does inflation remain lucrative for governments.
 
The current financial crisis, moreover, has reinforced the trend
toward lower seigniorage. Buried within the October 3, 2008
bailout bill, which set up the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), was a provision permitting the Fed to pay interest on
bank reserves, something other major central banks were doing
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Economics.already. Within days, the Fed implemented this new power,
essentially converting bank reserves into more government
debt. Fiat money traditionally pays no interest and, therefore,
allows the government to purchase real resources without incurring any future tax liability. Federal
Reserve notes will, of course, continue to earn no interest. But now, any seigniorage that
government gains from creating bank reserves will completely vanish or be greatly reduced,
depending entirely on the differential between market interest rates on the remaining government
debt and the interest rate on reserves. The lower is this differential, the less will be the
seigniorage. Indeed, this new constraint on seigniorage becomes tighter as people replace the use
of currency with bank debit cards and other forms of electronic fund transfers. In light of all these
factors, even inflation well into the double digits can do little to alleviate the U.S. government's
potential bankruptcy.
What about increasing the proceeds from explicit taxes? Examine Graph 1, which depicts both
federal outlays and receipts as a percent of GDP from 1940 to 2008. Two things stand out. First is
the striking behavior of federal tax revenue since the Korean War. Displaying less volatility than
expenditures, it has bumped up against 20 percent of GDP for well over half a century. That is
quite an astonishing statistic when you think about all the changes in the tax code over the
intervening years. Tax rates go up, tax rates go down, and the total bite out of the economy
remains relatively constant. This suggests that 20 percent is some kind of structural-political limit
for federal taxes in the United States. It also means that variations in the deficit resulted mainly
from changes in spending rather than from changes in taxes. The second fact that stands out in
the graph is that federal tax revenue at the height of World War II never quite reached 24 percent
of GDP. That represents the all-time high in U.S. history, should even the 20-percent-of-GDP post-
war barrier prove breachable.
Graph 1. Federal Outlays and Receipts as a Percent of GDP, 1940-2008
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Compare these percentages with that of President Barack Obama's first budget, which is slated to
come in at above 28 percent of GDP. Although this spending surge is supposed to be significantly
reversed when the recession is over, the administration's own estimates have federal outlays never
falling below 22 percent of GDP. And that is before the Social Security and Medicare increases
really kick in. In its latest long-term budget scenarios, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), not
known for undue pessimism, projects that total federal spending will rise over the next 75 years to
as much as 35 percent of GDP, not counting any interest on the accumulating debt, which critically
varies with how fast tax revenues rise. However, the CBO's highest projection for tax revenue over
the same span reaches a mere 26 percent of GDP. Notice how even that "optimistic" projection
assumes that Americans will put up with, on a regular peacetime basis, a higher level of federal
taxation than they briefly endured during the widely perceived national emergency of the Second
World War. Moreover, once you add in the interest on the growing debt because of the persistent
deficits, federal expenditures in 2083, according to the CBO, could range anywhere between 44
and 75 percent of GDP.
We all know that there is a limit to how much debt an individual or institution can pile on if future
income is rigidly fixed. We have seen why federal tax revenues are probably capped between 20
and 25 percent of GDP; reliance on seigniorage is no longer a viable option; and public-choice
dynamics tell us that politicians have almost no incentive to rein in Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid. The prospects are, therefore, sobering. Although many governments around the world
have experienced sovereign defaults, U.S. Treasury securities have long been considered risk-free.
That may be changing already. Prominent economists have starting considering a possible Treasury
default, while the business-news media and investment rating agencies have begun openly
discussing a potential risk premium on the interest rate that the U.S. government pays. The CBO
estimates that the total U.S. national debt will approach 100 percent of GDP within ten years, and
when Japan's national debt exceeded that level, the ratings of its government securities were
downgraded.
The much (unfairly) maligned credit default swaps (CDS) in February 2009 were charging more for
insurance against a default on U.S. Treasuries than for insurance against default of such major
U.S. corporations as Pepsico, IBM, and McDonald's. Because the premiums and payoffs of the CDS
on U.S. Treasury securities are denominated in Euros, the annual premiums also reflect exchange-
rate risk, which is probably why, with the subsequent modest decline in the dollar, CDS premiums
for ten-year Treasuries fell from 100 basis points to almost 30.  But you can make a plausible case
that CDS underestimate the probability of a Treasury default since such a default could easily
have far reaching financial repercussions, even hurting the counterparties providing the insurance
and impinging on their ability to make good on their CDS. Surely the purchasers of the U.S.
Treasury CDS have not overlooked this risk, which would be reflected in a lower annual premium for
less-valuable insurance.
Predicting an ultimate Treasury default is somewhat empty unless I can also say something about
its timing. The financial structure of the U.S. government currently has two nominal firewalls. The
first, between Treasury debt and unfunded liabilities, is provided by the trust funds of Social
Security, Medicare, and other, smaller federal insurance programs. These give investors the illusion
that the shaky fiscal status of social insurance has no direct effect on the government's formal
debt. But according to the latest intermediate projections of the trustees, the Hospital Insurance
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(HI-Medicare Part A) trust fund will be out of money in 2017, whereas the Social Security (OASDI)
trust funds will be empty by 2037.  Although other parts of Medicare are already funded from
general revenues, when HI and OASDI need to dip into general revenues, the first firewall is gone.
If investors respond by requiring a risk premium on Treasuries, the unwinding could move very fast,
much like the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. Politicians will be unable to react. Obviously,
this scenario is pure speculation, but I believe it offers some insight into the potential time frame.
The second financial firewall is between U.S. currency and government debt. It is not literally
impossible that the Federal Reserve could unleash the Zimbabwe option and repudiate the national
debt indirectly through hyperinflation, rather than have the Treasury repudiate it directly. But my
guess is that, faced with the alternatives of seeing both the dollar and the debt become worthless
or defaulting on the debt while saving the dollar, the U.S. government will choose the latter.
Treasury securities are second-order claims to central-bank-issued dollars. Although both may be
ultimately backed by the power of taxation, that in no way prevents government from
discriminating between the priority of the claims. After the American Revolution, the United States
repudiated its paper money and yet successfully honored its debt (in gold). It is true that fiat
money, as opposed to a gold standard, makes it harder to separate the fate of a government's
money from that of its debt. But Russia in 1998 is just one recent example of a government
choosing partial debt repudiation over a complete collapse of its fiat currency.
Admittedly, seigniorage is not the only way governments have benefited from inflation. Inflation
also erodes the real value of government debt, and if the inflation is not fully anticipated, the
interest the government pays will not fully compensate for the erosion. This happened during the
Great Inflation of the 1970s, when investors in long-term Treasury securities earned negative real
rates of return, generating for the government maybe one percent of GDP, or about twice as much
implicit revenue as came from seigniorage. But today's investors are far savvier and less likely to
get caught off guard by anything less than hyperinflation. To be clear, I am not denying that a
Treasury default might be accompanied by some inflation. Inflationary expectations, along with the
fact that part of the monetary base is now de facto government debt, can link the fates of
government debt and government money. This is all the more reason for the United States to try
to break the link and maintain the second financial firewall. We still may end up with the worst of
both worlds: outright Treasury default coupled with serious inflation. I am simply denying that such
inflation will forestall default.
Still unconvinced that the Treasury will default? The Zimbabwe option illustrates that other
potential outcomes, however unlikely, are equally unprecedented and dramatic. We cannot utterly
rule out, for instance, the possibility that the U.S. Congress might repudiate a major portion of
promised benefits rather than its debt. If it simply abolished Medicare outright, the unfunded
liability of Social Security would become tractable. Indeed, one of the current arguments for the
adoption of nationalized health care is that it can reduce Medicare costs. But this argument is
based on looking at other welfare States such as Great Britain, where government-provided health
care was rationed from the outset rather than subsidized with Medicare. Rationing can indeed drive
down health-care costs, but after more than forty years of subsidized health care in the United
States, how likely is it that the public will put up with severe rationing or that the politicians will
attempt to impose it? And don't kid yourself; the rationing will have to be quite severe to stave off
a future fiscal crisis.
Other welfare States have higher taxes as a proportion of GDP, with Sweden and Denmark in the
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lead at nearly 50 percent.  Can I really be confident that the United States will never follow their
example? Let us ignore all the cultural, political, and economic differences between small,
ethnically-unified European States and the United States. We still must factor in the take of state
and local governments, which, together with the federal government, raises the current tax bite in
the United States to 28 percent of GDP, only five percentage points below that of Canada. Recall
that the CBO projects that federal spending alone for 2082 will reach almost 35 percent of GDP,
excluding rising interest on the national debt. Thus, if taxes were to rise pari passu with spending,
the United States might be able to forestall bankruptcy with a total tax burden, counting federal,
state, and local, of around 45 percent of GDP—15 percentage points higher than the combined
total at its World War II peak, higher than in the United Kingdom and Germany today, and nearly
dead even with Norway and France. However, if there is any significant lag between expenditure
and tax increases, the increased debt would cause the proportion to rise even more. Furthermore,
this estimate relies on the CBO's economic and demographic assumptions about the future, along
with the assumption of absolutely no increase in state and local taxation as a percent of GDP.
More-pessimistic assumptions also drive the percentage up.
Even conceding that federal taxes might rise rapidly enough to a level noticeably higher than during
World War II overlooks an important consideration: All the social democracies are facing similar
fiscal dilemmas at almost the same time. Pay-as-you go social insurance is just not sustainable
over the long run, despite the higher tax rates in other welfare States. Even though the United
States initiated social insurance later than most of these other welfare States, it has caught up
with them because of the Medicare subsidy. In other words, the social-democratic welfare State
will come to end, just as the socialist State came to an end. Socialism was doomed by the
calculation problem identified by Ludwig Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Mises also argued that the
mixed economy was unstable and that the dynamics of intervention would inevitably drive it
towards socialism or laissez faire. But in this case, he was mistaken; a century of experience has
taught us that the client-oriented, power-broker State is the gravity well toward which public
choice drives both command and market economies. What will ultimately kill the welfare State is
that its centerpiece, government-provided social insurance, is simultaneously above reproach and
beyond salvation. Fully-funded systems could have survived, but politicians had little incentive to
enact them, and much less incentive to impose the huge costs of converting from pay-as-you-go.
Whether this inevitable collapse of social democracies will ultimately be a good or bad thing
depends on what replaces them.
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